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Intelligence Information Cable

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SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND

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SECRET

CITE

DIST 16 APRIL 1975

Political MATTERS

5-1210

COUNTRY: ARGENTINA

109-12-201

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SUBJECT: SECURITY SITUATION REPORT. AN ASSESSMENT OF

THE ROTENTIAL TERRORIST THREAT TO SECRETARY

KISSINGER IN ARGENTINA AS OF 16 APRIL 1975

SUMMARY. THERE ARE TWO ARGENTINE TERRORIST GROUPS WHICH ARE

DIRECT PHYSICAL ATTACK ON U.S. SECRETARY RESTATE HENRY
KISSINGER DURING HIS SCHEDULED VISIT TO ARGENTINA, THESE ARE
THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (ERP) AND THE MONTONEROS. WHILE APR 22 1975
BOTH ORGANIZATIONS CAN BE EXPECTED TO TAKE SOME ACTION, INCLUDING
POSSIBLE SIGNIFICANT ACTS OF TERRORISM, IT IS NOT BELIEVED THAT
EITHER WILL ATTEMPT TO CARRY OUT A DIRECT ATTACK AGAINST DR.

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KISSINGER. THESE TWO GROUPS, EITHER INDEPENDENTLY OR IN
COOPERATION WITH CTHER TERRORIST GROUPS, WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY
TRY TO ORGANIZE LIGHTNING STREET DEMONSTRATIONS AND WILL PROBABLY
ENGAGE IN BOMBING ATTACKS AND OTHER ACTS OF THIS NATURE IN AN
EFFORT TO EMBARRASS THE U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE AND POSSIBLY
DISRUPT HIS VISIT, LEFTIST, NON-TERRORIST GROUPS IN ARGENTINA,
INCLUDING UNIVERSITY STUDENTS, MAY ALSO ATTEMPT TO PROTEST DR.
KISSINGER'S PRESENCE IN THE COUNTRY WITH SMALL STREET DEMONSTRATIONS, PUBLICATION OF PAMPHLETS, WALL PAINTINGS, ETC. HOWEVER,
ARGENTINE SECURITY FORCES ARE PREPARED TO USE WHATEVER MANPOWER
IS REQUIRED TO CONTROL THE STREETS AND THEY CAN BE EXPECTED TO
KEEP STREET AGITATION TO A NUISANCE LEVEL. END SUMMARY.

THE WEAPONRY, MANPOWER, TRAINING, DETERMINATION AND SUPPORT MECHANISMS TO CONSIDER UNDERTAKING A DIRECT, PHYSICAL ATTACK AGAINST U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY KISSINGER DURING HIS VISIT TO ARGENTINA FROM 23 TO 25 APRIL 1975. THESE ARE THE ERP. A MARXIST ORGANIZATION OF TROTSKYIST BACKGROUND, WHICH IS THE MILITARY ARM OF THE REVOLUTIONARY WORKERS! PARTY (PRT); AND THE MONTONEROS. MARXIST/SOCIALIST GROUP A LEFT+WING

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PERONIST ORIENTATION.

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THE MONTONEROS HAVE EFFECTIVELY DEMONSTRATED A HIGH CAPABILITY FOR PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS INVOLVING ABDUCTIONS AND ASSASSINATIONS, INCLUDING THOSE AGAINST WELL -PROTECTED THE ASSASSINATION OF FEDERAL POLICE CHIEF ALBERTO V I L L A R ON 1 NOVEMBER 1974 WAS AN EXAMPLE OF MONTONERO PROFICIENCY IN THIS REGARD. THE MONTONEROS ARE NOTED FOR THEIR PROFESSIONALISM IN PLANNING AND EXECUTING TERRORIST OPERATIONS. WHICH ALWAYS APPEAR TO BE BASED ON EXCELLENT INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION. MOST OBSERVERS BELIEVE THAT THE MONTONEROS HAVE THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT PENETRATED AT MOST LEVELS, PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF THEIR PAST PERONIST AFFILIATION AND A PRESUMED HIGH NUMBER OF CURRENT SYMPATHIZERS WITHIN GOVERNMENT POSITIONS. WHILE THE MONTONEROS HAVE PLANNED AND CARRIED OUT HIGH RISK OPERATIONS IN THE PAST, IT IS NOT BELIEVED THAT THEY WILL UNDERTAKE AN OPERATION IF THE RISKS ARE JUDGED TO BE UNACCEPTABLE FROM A SECURITY STANDPOINT. IN ADDITION, MILITARY

3 E O R E T

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OPERATIONS OF THE MONTONEROS ARE SUBORDINATE TO THEIR POLITICAL OBJECTIVES. /E025x1 3. THE MONTONEROS CONSIDERED, BUT SUBSEQUENTLY REJECTED, AN ATTEMPT TO ASSASSINATE SECRETARY KISSINGER DURING HIS STAY IN ARGENTINA. REASONING FOR REJECTING THIS COURSE OF ACTION WAS THE BELIEF THAT IT WOULD TURN OUT TO BE POLITICALLY COUNTERPRODUCTIVE FOR THE MONTONEROS. IF THIS WERE THE CASE, IT IS PROBABLE THAT THE HIGH RISK INVOLVED IN SUCH AN UNDERTAKING WAS ALSO A FACTOR WHICH WAS CONSIDERED. ALLEGED THAT AN AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED BETWEEN THE MONTONEROS AND THE ERP TO DIVIDE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROTESTING THE SCHEDULED VISIT OF SECRETARY KISSINGER AND CHILEAN PRESIDENT AUGUSTO P I N O C H E T. WHO IS DUE TO MEET WITH PRESIDENT MARIA ESTELA M A R T I N E Z DE PERON IN BARILOCHE ON 18 APRIL. É025x1 THE MONTONERS WERE SELECTED TO PROTEST THE KISSINGER VISIT, WHILE THE ERP WAS GIVEN RESPONSIBILITY TO REPUDIATE PINOCHET'S ARRIVAL. THIS IS CREDIBLE FOR TWO REASONS: A) THE ERP HAS SUFFERED HEAVY LOSSES RECENTLY THROUGH POLICE RAIDS REGIONAL ORGANIZATION IN BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE THESE RAIDS

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UNCOVERED MEMBERSHIP LISTS, SAFE SITE AND MEETING LOCATIONS, AND OTHER MATERIAL CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL TO THE FUNCTIONING OF A CLANDESTINE ORGANIZATION. THE RAIDS HAVE EFFECTIVELY DISRUPTED THE SUPPORT MECHANISM OF THE ERP IN BUENOS AIRES AND HAVE GREATLY HINDERED THE CAPABILITY OF THE ERP TO MOUNT SIGNIFICANT TERRORIST OPERATIONS IN THIS AREA FOR THE TIME BEING. 2) A CHILEAN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION, THE MOVE-MENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT (MIR), IS PART OF THE ERP-SPONSORED REVOLUTIONARY COORDINATING COMMITTEE, A GROUP FORMED TO COORDINATE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN THE SOUTHERN CONE OF LATIN AMERICA. THE ERP WOULD PROBABLY BE VERY WILLING TO UNDERTAKE TERRORIST ACTION TO REPUDIATE PINOCHET'S VISIT AS A FRATERNAL GESTURE TO ITS CHILEAN TERRORIST ASSOCIATE, THE MIR. BECAUSE OF THE ALLEGED U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN THE OVERTHROW OF THE ALLENDE GOVERNMENT IN CHILE IN 1973, THE ERP MIGHT FEEL OBLIGATED TO TAKE SOME ACTION TO PROTEST KISSINGER'S VISIT, EVEN IF AN AGREEMENT EXISTS TO GIVE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS TO THE MONTONEROS. IN THIS EVENTUALITY, THE PRIZERP COULD BE EXPECTED TO USE ITS SEMI-LEGAL FRONT GROUPS IN BUENOS AIRES TO PARTICIPATE IN LIGHTNING STREET DEMONSTRATIONS AND OTHER

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| ACTS. | . <u> </u> | /E025x1 | |
| 4. IF. | | THE MONTONEROS HAVE RE | EJECTED ANY |
| CONSIDERAT | ION OF A DIRE | CT ATTACK AGAINST DR. H | CISSINGER, THEIR |
| FOCUS WOUL | D LIKELY BE D | IRECTED TOWARD A TERROF | RIST INCIDENT |

THE

POSSIBILITY OF AN ABDUCTION/ASSASSINATION OPERATION AGAINST

A U.S. OFFICIAL IN BUENOS AIRES. SIMILAR TO THAT CARRIED OUT

BY THE MONTONEROS IN FEBRUARY 1975 AGAINST U.S. CONSULAR AGENT

WHICH WOULD HAVE HIGH IMPACT AND WHICH COULD HAVE REVERBERA-

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SUCCESS OF HIS VISIT.

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JOHN PATRICK EGAN, THIS IS A THREAT WHICH CANNOT BE DISCOUNTED.

PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF RECENT MONTONERO TERRORIST HISTORY, BUT

THE MONTONEROS MAY ALSO REJECT THIS PATH, AGAIN FOR THE POSSIBLE

REASON THAT THEY MIGHT CONSIDER IT TO BE POLITICALLY COUNTER—

PRODUCTIVE AT A TIME WHEN INTERNATIONAL FOCUS WILL BE ON

ARGENTINA. OTHER POSSIBLE TERRORIST ALTERNATIVES FOR THE

MONTONEROS COULD INCLUDE BOMBING OR ROCKET ATTACKS AGAINST THE U.S.

EMBASSY BUILDING OR RESIDENCE. BOTH ACTIONS COULD GIVE THE

MONTONEROS THE PUBLICITY THEY SEEK AND WOULD HELP DETRACT

FROM THE SUCCESS OF DR. KISSINGER'S VISIT WITHOUT THE RISKS

THAT OTHER, MORE INVOLVED OPERATIONS MIGHT ENTAIL.

UNIVERSITY STUDENTS AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF ARGENTINA (PCA)
CAN BE EXPECTED TO ATTEMPT TO PROTEST SECRETARY KISSINGER'S
VISIT WITH LIGHTNING STREET DEMONSTRATIONS, PUBLICATION OF
ANTI-U.S., ANTI-KISSINGER PAMPHLETS, WALL PAINTING AND FIRE
BOMBING ATTACKS AGAINST U.S. BUSINESSES IN BUENOS AIRES. SUCH
ACTIONS COULD BE COORDINATED WITH THE MONTONEROS AND/OR THE
PRIVERP FRONT GROUPS OR COULD BE CARRIED OUT INDEPENDENTLY.
THE ISSUES OF CHILE, INDOCHINA, CUBA AND THE U.S. TRADE BILL

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COULD BE USED AS OSTENSIBLE PRETEXTS FOR THE LEFTIST FORCES.
TO MOBILIZE YOUTH AND STUDENTS FOR THESE ANTI-U.S. PROTESTS.

- 6. ARGENTINE SECURITY FORCES ARE PREPARED TO USE WHATEVER MANPOWER IS REQUIRED TO CONTROL THE STREETS OF BUENOS AIRES DURING THE VISIT BY THE U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE, AND IT IS EXPECTED THAT THE SECURITY FORCES CAN KEEP STREET AGITATION DOWN TO A NUISANCE LEVEL. THE FEDERAL POLICE ARE EXPERIENCED IN PROVIDING PROTECTION TO VISITING DIGNITARIES AND LOCAL OFFICIALS. AND FEDERAL POLICE INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS HAVE VOICED CONFIDENCE IN THE CAPABILITY OF THE POLICE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROTECTION TO DR. KISSINGER DURING A BRIEF VISIT TO ARGENTINA. DR. KISSINGER'S MOVEMENTS IN ARGENTINA WILL BE FOLLOWED WITH MASSIVE POLICE FORCES. SINCE THE MAJOR TERRORIST GROUPS IN ARGENTINA ACT CLANDESTINELY AND ARE ARRESTED OR CAPTURED ON SIGHT, THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT WILL PROBABLY NOT UNDERTAKE WIDESPREAD PREVENTIVE DETENTION OF KNOWN LEFTISTS PRIOR TO OR. KISSINGER'S ARRIVAL.
- 7. ARGENTINE SECURITY FORCES WILL PROBABLY INSIST UPON MINIMUM PUBLIC EXPOSURE FOR DR. KISSINGER DURING HIS STAY IN ARGENTINA. BECAUSE OF THE LATE HOUR OF HIS ARRUAL IN BUENOS

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AIRES, IT IS NOT EXPECTED THAT CROWD CONTROL WILL PRESENT MUCH OF A PROBLEM AT THE AIRPORT. IN VIEW OF THE EARLY HOUR OF HIS DEPARTURE ON 25 APRIL, AIRPORT CROWD CONTROL WILL AGAIN PRESENT MINIMAL DIFFICULTIES. IT IS EXPECTED THAT ONLY A FEW LOCAL PRESS REPRESENTATIVES WILL BE ON HAND FOR DR. KISSINGER'S ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE AT EZEIZA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT. THE MAJORITY OF THE PRESS WILL PROBABLY GREET DR. KISSINGER AT AEROPARQUE AIRPORT, WHERE DR. KISSINGER WILL BE TAKEN BY HELICOPTER OR PRESIDENTIAL PLANE FROM EZEIZA.

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IORS THE PROLETARIAN FACTION WANTS TO

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1975 MONTEVIDEO, PROSELYTIZE AMONG THE

T-WITH ANY-LEFTIST GROUPS WHICH HAVE MANAGED TO RETAIN VESTIGES OF AN ORGANIZATION. THE MLN IN MONTYIDEO DOES NOT NEED TO MOUNT FUNDING OPERATIONS BECAUSE IT SUPPOSEDLY CAN GET WHATEVER MONEY IT NEEDS FROM ARGENTINA, END SUMMARY.

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DISSENSION WITHIN THE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT (MLN-TUPAMAROS) IN ARGENTINA HAD LED TO THE FORMATION OF TWO RIVAL FACTIONS, ONE FACTION, THE PROLETARIANS, CONSISTS MAINLY OF YOUNGER MLN LEADERS WITH AN AFFINITY FOR THE ARGENTINE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (ERP),

| THE SECOND FACTIO | N, | | | | | | |
|---------------------|--------------|--------|-------|--------|--------|-------|-----|
| | IS 1 EO25 | HEADED | BY OL | DER ML | l LEAI | DERS. | THE |
| PROLETARIAN FACTION | | , | HAD | TAKEN | OVER | THE | MLN |
| CENTRAL COMMITTEE.) | • | | ` . | | | | |

2. AS RIVALRY BETWEEN THE PROLETARIAN AND "PETIT BOURGEOIS" FACTIONS GREW, THE MLN DECIDED TO POSTPONE ITS "SO-CALLED" THIRD MLN CONVENTION WHICH WAS SCHEDULED TO BE HELD IN CUBA IN LATE JANUARY OR EARLY FEBRUARY. THE "PETIT BOURGEOIS" FACTION BEGAN CALLING ITSELF "THE MICRO ORGANIZATION," (THE MICRO), REMINISCENT OF A SPLINTER GROUP WHICH BROKE OFF FROM THE MLN IN THE LATE 1960'S. THE MICRO ACQUIRED CONSIDERABLE STRENGTH AMONG MLN MEMBERS IN SAN MARTIN, AN INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX NEAR BUENOS AIRES, AND CONTROLLED THE COMMITTEE OF FAMILIES OF POLITICAL PRISONERS, AN MLN FRONT GROUP, THE MICRO INCLUDED SEVERAL MLN LEADERS IN CUBA WITH CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE.

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| C. F. C. D. F. T |
| S E C R E T |
| 3. BY LATE JANUARY 1975, PROLETARIAN LEADERS |
| HAD WON MOST OF THE SAN MARTIN MLN CONTINGENT AWAY FROM THE MICRO, |
| HOWEVER, DURING THE MONTH OF FEBRUARY, DISSENSION BETWEEN THE FACTIONS |
| PERSISTED TO THE POINT OF THREATENED VIOLENCE. BOTH SIDES ISSUED |
| DECLARATIONS OF THEIR POSITIONS, CAUSING THE PROLETARIAN FACTION |
| LEADERS TO WORRY THAT RANK-AND-FILE TUPAMAROS WOULD BECOME CONFUSED |
| AND DEMORALIZED. E025x1 |
| 4. WALTER GONZALEZ DIAZ, ALIASES |
| "TOMAS" AND "ABUSO", A PRINCIPAL PROLETARIAN LEADER, SAID THAT THE |
| PROLETARIAN FACTION AND THE MICRO HAD HAD A RAPPROACHMENT AND HE |
| DID NOT BELIEVE THE MICRO WOULD ANY LONGER BE A PROBLEM. THE |
| RAPPROACHMENT WAS BASED ON THEIR COMMON GOAL OF SOMEHOW SECURING |
| THE RELEASE FROM PRISON OF AN IMPORTANT MLN LEADER. THE MICRO |
| TURNED THE COMMITTEE OF FAMILIES OF POLITICAL PRISONERS, SOME 20 |
| IMPORTANT CONTACTS IN EUROPE, SOME CADRE, AND MOST OF ITS FUNDS |
| OVER TO THE MLN CENTRAL COMMITTEE. |
| 5. DESPITE ITS QUARREL WITH THE MICRO, THE PROLETARIAN FACTION, |
| WENT AHEAD WITH PLANS FOR: 1) INFIL- |
| TRATING LEADERS BACK INTO URUGUAY FROM BUENOS AIRES, 2) BUILDING |
| INFRASTRUCTURE IN MONTEVIDEO, AND 3) PROSELYTIZING AMONG THE WORKING CLASS. ONE TACTIC UNDER CONSIDERATION WAS TO HAVE MLN |
| MEMBERS BUY LAND IN A POOR DISTRICT AND BEGIN BUILDING |
| A HOUSE ON 1T. CUSTOMARILY IN SUCH CASES NEIGHBORS |
| JOIN IN VOLUNTARILY TO HELP, AND THE MLN WOULD BE ABLE |
| TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THIS TO MEET AND INFLUENCE PEOPLE |
| AT LOWER ECONOMIC LEVELS. 6. THE MLN MILITARY CADRE CONTINUED DURING THE EARLY PART |
| OF 1975 TO TRAIN IN ARGENTINA, CHIEFLY IN TUCUMAN. SOME MLN MEMBERS |
| HAVE BEEN KILLED THERE, BUT IT HAS NOT BEEN ENOUGH TO WORRY THE |
| PROLETARIAN FACTION UNDULY. ACCORDING TO GONZALEZ, CUBAN INSTRUCTORS |
| ARE OFFERING COURSES IN ARGENTINA FOR THE MLN, THE ERP, THE ARGENTINE |
| MONTONEROS, AND CHILEAN GUERRILLAS. GONZALEZ DESCRIBED THE COURSES AS |
| 5 OFFERING A GOOD BASE IN REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES OF ALL TYPES. 5 |
| COMMENT: THERE IS NO INDEPENDENT EVIDENCE THAT CUBAN NATIONALS |
| ARE TRAINING LATIN AMERICAN GUERILLAS IN ARGENTINA.) |

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| E025x1 7. | |
| THE MLN HAD RECEIVED AN OVERTURE FROM THE URUGUAYAN | |
| COMMUNIST PARTY (PCU) ABOUT FORMING A JOINT | |
| RESISTANCE FRONT, THE MLN WAS INITIALLY WILLING TO | |
| DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH THE PCU. THE MLN ALSO ALLEGEDLY | |
| HAD CONTACT WITH ZELMARYM I C H E L I N I AND ENRIQUE | |
| ERRO, LEFTIST URUGUAYAN EX-SENATORS IN EXILE IN | |
| ARGENTINA. THE PROLETARIAN FACTION WAS INTERESTED IN | |
| PINPOINTING AND MEETING WITH ANY LEFTIST GROUPS IN | |
| URUGUAY, OF WHATEVER ORIENTATION, WHICH STILL RETAINED A | |
| DEGREE OF ORGANIZATION. FOIA(b)(3) - 50 USC 403g - CIA | |
| GONZALEZ RETURNED FROM BUENOS | |
| AIRES TO URUGUAY WHERE HE WAS PLANNING TO REMAIN | |
| INDEFINITELY, WORKING TO REORGANIZE THE HOME-BASED MLN. E025x1 | |
| COMMENT: GONZALEZ IS A MUCH-WANTED MLN | |
| FUGITIVE WHO ESCAPED ON 6 SEPTEMBER 1971 FROM PUNTA | |
| CARRETAS PRISON IN MONTEVIDEO WITH 105 OTHER | * |
| TUPAMAROS. HE HAS A LONG HISTORY OF MLN ACTIVITIES.) | |
| TWO OTHER PROLETARIAN MLN LEADERS WERE ALSO TO RETURN | |
| TO URUGUAY FROM BUENOS AIRES. ONE OF THEM BEING ARY | |
| QUIROGA ALE, ALIAS "PACO" AND "ELACO." | |
| COMMEN.T: | |
| QUIROGA WAS- | ٠. |
| CAPTURED WHILE TRYING TO ENTER URUGUAY AT | |
| THE PORT OF FRAY BENTOS | • • • • |
| THE MLN CONTINGENT IN URUGUAY OPPOSED THE RETURN OF | · · · · |
| LEADERS OTHER THAN THESE THREE, | |
| BECAUSE THE INFRASTRUCTURE IS STILL TOO FLIMSY TO | |
| PROVIDE FOR MORE. HOWEVER, GONZALEZ IS EXPECTING A FOIA(b)(3) - 50 USC 30 - Intelligence Sources Methods | |
| LEADER OF THE REVOLUTIONARY WORKERS PARTY (PRT) TO | mak yan sepamba |
| VISIT MONTEVIDED AND ASSESS CONDITIONS IN THE LABOR | |
| 5 MOVEMENT FOR PLANNING PURPOSES. COMMENT: | .5 |
| 3 USUALLY PRT WOULD MEAN THE ARGENTINE PRT, POLITICAL | 3 |
| 1 ORGANIZATION OF WHICH THE ERP IS THE ARMED APPARAT. | . 1 |

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HOWEVER, IN THIS CASE, IT IS MORE LIKELY THAT GONZALEZ IS EXPECTING AN URUGUAYAN WHO BELONGS TO THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE THE MLN CREATED IN EARLY 1974 WHICH, AS OF MAY 1974, WAS CALLED THE REVOLUTIONARY LENINIST PARTY (PRL).

THE MLN ORGANIZATIONAL SCHEME IS BELIEVED TO STILL BE LARGELY THEORETICAL, AND MLN MEMBERS PROBABLY SWITCH NAMES AND ACRONYMS AROUND FREQUENTLY.)

- GONZALEZ ARRIVED USING FALSE ARGENTINE DOCUMENTS. FIRST STAYED IN A HOTEL ACQUIRED FOR HIM BY AN MLN. CONTACT IN MONTEVIDEO. THEN HE MOVED TO A PRIVATE HOME, WHERE HE WAS AWAIT-FALSE URUGUAYAN DOCUMENTS. GONZALEZ IS INTERESTED IN ACQUIRING A SAFE SITE, WHICH WOULD BE SUITABLE FOR A "PEOPLE'S PRISON" AND ANOTHER TO SET UP A CLANDESTINE PRINTING ESTABLISHMENT. THE MLN IN MONTEVIDEO HAS A MIMEOGRAPH MACHINE BUT IF NECESSARY, WILL BRING A PHOTOCOPIER FROM ARGENTINA. GONZALEZ HAS INSTRUCTED THE MONTEVIDEO MLN CONTINGENT NOT TO CARRY OUT OPERATIONS TO ACQUIRE FUNDS. HE SAID THE MLN HAS RICH CONTACTS IN ARGENTINA WHO CAN BE PERSUADED TO PROVIDE AS MUCH AS 300 MILLION PESOS ON COMMENT: IT IS NOT KNOWN WHETHER GONZALEZ SHORT NOTICE. MEANT URUGUAYAN OR ARGENTINE PESOS. IF URUGUAYAN PESOS, THE EQUIVALENT SUM WOULD BE U.S. \$124,500; IF OLD ARGENTINE PESOS, THE EQUIVALENT WOULD BE U.S. \$100,000.) ACCORDING TO GONZALEZ, THE MLN WOULD SPEND ANY AMOUNT OF MONEY TO GET AN IMPORTANT MLN LEADER OUT OF PRISON AND HAS WONDERED ABOUT BRIBING SOME KEY URU-GUAYAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL.
- SHORTLY AFTER ARRIVAL, GONZALEZ HAD A POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS CHANCE ENCOUNTER WITH A CHILDHOOD FRIEND WHO IS NOW SERVING IN THE URUGUAYAN NAVY. THE FRIEND ASSURED GONZALEZ HE WOULD NOT TURN HIM IN. HE INVITED GONZALEZ HOME FOR A MEAL AND WARNED HIM AGAINST ENTERING CERTAIN PARTS OF THE CITY WHICH ARE 5 HEAVILY PATROLLED BY THE POLICE OR THE ARMY. THE EPISODE MADE
- 3 GONZALEZ EVEN MORE SECURITY CONSCIOUS, HE WANTS ALL MEETINGS SITES
- RECONNOITERED CAREFULLY BEFOREHAND AND IS WARY OF APPROACHES FROM

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DIST 15 APRIL 1975

POLITICAL MATTERS

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DIST 15 APRIL 1975

A COUNTRY I ARGENTINA/CHILE

SUBJECT : XTERRORIST PLANS OF THE MONTONEROS TO PROTEST AND

TRY TO FORCE THE CANCELLATION OF DR. KISSINGER'S

PROPERS FROM DISTRIBUTION ARMY ARMY

TRIP TO ARGENTINAL ERPLMONTONERO AGREEMENT TO PRO-

TEST THE VISIT OF DR. KISSINGER AND GENERAL PINOCHET

SUMMARY,

MONTONEROS, A MARXIST/SOCIALIST TERRORIST ORGANIZATION OF

LEFT-WING PERONIST ORIENTATION, ARE PLANNING TO CARRY OUT ACTS

OF TERRORISM AND TO ORGANIZE OF THE DISTURBANCES TO PROTEST THE

VISIT OF DR. HENRY KISSINGER TO ARGENTINA.

MONTONEROS ARE ALSO CONSIDERING TERRORIST ACTS AGAINST U.S.

BUSINESS INTERESTS AND U.S. PERSONNEL AS A MEANS TO TRY TO FORCE THE

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| CANCELLATION OF DR. KISSINGER'S PROJECTED TRIP. |
|---|
| A MEMBER OF A FORMER FACTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY |
| (ERP), A MARXIST TERRORIST ORGANIZATION OF TROTSKYIST BACKGROUND, |
| CLAIMED THAT THE MONTONEROS AND THE ERP ARE COORDINATING THEIR |
| TERRORIST OPERATIONS. ANOTHER MEMBER OF A FORMER ERP FACTION SAID |
| AN AGREEMENT HAS BEEN MADE TO HAVE THE MONTONEROS PROTEST DR. |
| KISSINGER'S VISIT, WHILE THE ERP WAS GIVEN THE RESPONSIBILITY TO |
| UNDERTAKE TERRORIST ACTION TO PROTEST THE SCHEDULED VISIT OF |
| CHILEAN PRESIDENT AUGUSTO PINOCHET TO ARGENTINA ON CHILE |
| 18 APRIL. THE "CHE" GUEVARA FACTION OF |
| THE RESENTINE ARMED FORCES OF LIBERATION (FAL-CHE), IS |
| PLANNING, WITH OTHER LEFTIST GROUPS, TO STAGE A SERIES OF DEMON- |
| STRATIONS TO REPUDIATE DR. KISSINGER'S PRESENCE IN ARGENTINA. |
| // |
| NO SUCH PLANNING INCLUDED EFFORTS TO UNDERTAKE |
| DIRECT ACTS AGAINST U.S. PERSONNEL. END SUMMARY. |
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THE MONTONEROS ARE PLANNING TO CARRY OUT ACTS OF TERRORISM AND ORGANIZE OTHER DISTURBANCES TO PROTEST THE VISIT OF DR. HENRY

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| THE ARRIVA | L OF THE U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE IN AN ATTEMPT TO | x |
| | CANCELLATION OF HIS VISIT. | |
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THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE ERP AND THE MONTONEROS ARE VERY CORDIAL E025x1

THE TWO ORGANIZATIONS HAVE SET UP A COORDINATING

COMMITTEE TO AVOID DUPLICATION OF TERRORIST OPERATIONS AND TO WORK OUT TARGET PRIORITIES AND ASSIGNMENTS.

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KISSINGER AND PRESIDENT AUGUSTO PINOCHET OF CHILE, THE MONTONEROS WERE GIVEN RESPONSIBILITY FOR

WITH JOINT PLANS TO PROTEST THE VISITS TO ARGENTINA OF DR.

TERRORIST ACTION TO PROTEST THE SCHEDULED VISIT OF DR. KISSINGER,

WHILE THE ERP WAS TO HANDLE THE PROTESTS RELATING TO PINOCHET.

THE MONTONEROS HAD ORIGINALLY DISCUSSED THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ATTEMPT TO ASSASS-INATE KISSINGER, BUT THIS WAS DISCARDED - AS BEING COUNTERPRODUC-TIVE. THE MONTONEROS EVENTUALLY DECIDED UPON EFFORTS TO MAKE DR. KISSINGER'S VISIT TO ARGENTINA AS EMBARRASSING TO HIM AS:

POSSIBLE.

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COMMENT: GENERAL PINOCHET IS

TO ARRIVE IN ARGENTINA ON 18 APRIL. HE IS TO MEET

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3024(i)(1) - Intelligence Sources and Methods 552866 WARNING NOTICE PAGE 5 OF L PAGES SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED THIS INFORMATION IS NOT TO SECRET BE INCLUDED IN ANY OTHER DOCUMENT OR PUBLICATION. (classification) (diesem controls) WITH ARGENTINE PRESIDENT MARIA ESTEL AXM A R T I N E Z DE PERON IN SOUTHERN ARGENTINA, AT THE TOURIST RESORT OF SAN 10.4 CARLOS DE BARILOCHE. THE FAL-CHE, A MINOR MARXIST TERRORIST GROUP IN ARGENTINA. ACTIVELY PLANNING A SERIES OF MINOR DEMONSTRATIONS AND TERRORIST ACTS TO PROTEST THE ARRIVAL OF DR. KISSINGER TO ARGENTINA. THIS ACTION IS DESIGNED TO EMBARRASS THE U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE AND POSSIBLY DISRUPT HIS VISIT.

THE FAL-CHE WOULD BE WORKING WITH OTHER LEFTIST GROUPS IN

ORGANIZING THE DEMONSTRATIONS. COMMENT:

NO REFERENCE TO ANY CONTEMPLATED ACTS AGINST U.S.

PERSONNEL IN ARGENTINA IN CONNECTION WITH THE VISIT OF SECRETARY KISSINGER.)

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| THE MONTONEROS ARE FOLLOWING A TWO-PRONGED, POLITICAL AND MILITARY STRATEGY IN THEIR QUEST FOR THE ACQUISITION OF POWER IN ARGENTINA. WHILE THEY MAY BELIEVE IN THE INEVITABILITY OF ARMED STRUGGL THEY WOULD PROBABLY ACCEPT A POLITICAL SOLUTION, IF SUCH AN OPPORTUNITY WERE PRESENTED TO THEM. THE MONTONEROS WOULD HAVE LITTLE QUALMS OVER POSSIBLE FUTURE TERRORIST ACTS AGAINST U.S. OFFICIALS IN ARGENTINA, IF THEY BELIEVED THAT THEY WOULD OBTAIN A SUFFICIENT POLITICAL OR TACTICAL OBJECTIVE THROUGH SUCH—ACTION.) | | | | •• |
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